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Empire of AI

Empire of AI

Karen Hao

Finished

Finished: 19 September 2026

Highlights

Rarely have they seen any “trickle-down” gains of this so-called technological revolution; the benefits of generative AI mostly accrue upward.
They project tantalizing ideas of modernity and posture aggressively about the need to defeat other empires to provide cover for, and to fuel, invasions of privacy, theft, and the cataclysmic automation of large swaths of meaningful economic opportunities.
This was a favorite argument in Silicon Valley—the inevitability card. If we don’t do it, somebody else will. “The trajectory is already there,” he emphasized, “but the thing we can influence is the initial conditions under which it’s born
He spoke like Michelangelo, as though AGI already existed within the marble he was carving. All he had to do was chip away until it revealed itself
deep learning’s supercharging of Silicon Valley would also aggressively expand its business model, for which Harvard professor Shoshana Zuboff would coin a term in 2014: surveillance capitalism. Where industrial capitalism derived value from producing material goods that people wanted to buy, surveillance capitalism, Zuboff argued, treated its users as the product. Tech giants sitting atop vast amounts of user data could easily pump those troves into neural networks to more precisely profile users than ever before and milk their engagement for ad revenue
In 2019, an NBC investigation16 from Olivia Solon knocked off my rose-colored glasses. Solon revealed that facial-recognition software had been trained on millions of people’s personal Flickr photos without their consent. What surprised me was not the findings—I had long known that Flickr was a favorite data source for AI researchers
Even the term hallucinations is subtly misleading. It suggests that the bad behavior is an aberration, a bug, when it’s actually a feature of the probabilistic pattern-matching mechanics of neural networks
In the end, Moore’s Law was not based on some principle of physics. It was an economic and political observation that Moore made about the rate of progress that he could drive his company to achieve, and an economic and political choice that he made to follow it. When he did, Moore took the rest of the computer chip industry with him, as other companies realized it was the most competitive business strategy. OpenAI’s Law, or what the company would later replace with an even more fevered pursuit of so-called scaling laws, is exactly the same. It is not a natural phenomenon. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy
As ChatGPT swept the world by storm in early 2023, a Chinese AI researcher would share with me a clear-eyed analysis that unraveled OpenAI’s inevitability argument. What OpenAI did never could have happened anywhere but Silicon Valley, he said. In China, which rivals the US in AI talent, no team of researchers and engineers, no matter how impressive, would get $1 billion, let alone ten times more, to develop a massively expensive technology without an articulated vision of exactly what it would look like and what it would be good for. Only after ChatGPT’s release did Chinese companies and investors begin funding the development of gargantuan models with gusto, having now seen enough evidence that they could recoup their investments through commercial applications.
One section of the pamphlet, declassified in 2008, lists simple instructions for how to destabilize and undermine the productivity of an organization, including: Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible. Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions. Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision. Ask endless questions.
But in April 2023, John Schulman, one of the scientists on OpenAI’s founding team, would remind the audience during a talk at UC Berkeley56 that the issue of hallucinations was rooted in the nature of neural networks. Unlike the deterministic information databases of symbolic systems, neural networks would always traffic in fuzzy probabilities. Even with RLHF, which helped to strengthen the probabilities within a deep learning model that correlate with accuracy, there was fundamentally a limit to how far the technique can go. “The model obviously has to guess sometimes when it’s outputting a lot of detailed factual information,” he said. “No matter how you train it, it’s going to have probabilities on things and it’s going to have to guess sometimes.”
margin.” But within the AI industry, people agreed
But as much as each ideology professed to be the opposite to the other, both were in fact preaching from the same bible. Both discussed AGI as an increasingly foregone conclusion and with a religious ferocity; both fixated on the long term and asserted a moral authority to keep AI development within the control of its adherents. Where one warned of fire and brimstone, the other tantalized with visions of heaven
While scale can lead17 to more advanced capabilities, the inverse is not true: Advanced capabilities do not require scale. A deep learning model trained only on high-quality biological data, for example, can be a very powerful generator of biological recipes at very small scale
What I reject is the dangerous notion that broad benefit from AI can only be derived from—indeed, will ever emerge from—a vision for the technology that requires the complete capitulation of our privacy, our agency, and our worth, including the value of our labor and art, toward an ultimately imperial centralization project.
As Joseph Weizenbaum, MIT professor22 and inventor of the ELIZA chatbot, said in the 1960s, “Once a particular program is unmasked, once its inner workings are explained in language sufficiently plain to induce understanding, its magic crumbles away.